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COMMENTS
BAD FAITH STRICTLY DEFINED FOR
PRIVATE COMMODITIES LAWSUITS:
SAM WONG & SON, INC. v. NEW YORK
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE
The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)l provides the mecha-
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982) (originally enacted as the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, §§ 1-12,
42 Stat. 998, 998-1003 (1922)). Congressional attempts to regulate commodities futures trad-
ing can be traced back to the Futures Trading Act of 1921, ch. 186, 42 Stat. 187. The Su-
preme Court, in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68 (1922), declared the Futures Trading Act
unconstitutional because of a "burdensome" penalty tax on improper grain futures transac-
tions. Id. at 66-67. Congress responded by enacting the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat.
998 (1922), which was upheld as a valid exercise of the congressional commerce power. See
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1923). The concept of self-regulation dom-
inated the Act, and, consequently, exchanges were required to regulate trade to prevent
price manipulation and other abuses. See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5843, 5855. Congress amended the Act, see Commodi-
ties Exchange Act (CEA), ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936), because it did not provide sufficient
legal authority to enforce regulations against excessive speculation and other abusive prac-
tices, see Valdez, Modernizing the Regulation of the Commodity Futures Markets, 13
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 38 (1975). In 1968, extensive changes were made to the CEA, see Pub.
L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 (1968), including an amendment requiring contract markets to
enforce their rules, see id. § 12(c), 82 Stat. at 29 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a (8)-(9) (1982)).
In 1974 Congress overhauled the CEA by enacting the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 96-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). The most significant effect of this
legislation was the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a new
regulatory agency charged with implementing the CEA. See Valdez, supra, at 37. By giving
the CFTC broad regulatory and enforcement powers, see generally id. at 44-51, Congress
hoped to ensure "fair practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges," and pre-
vent activities that would adversely affect commodities trading, see S. REP. No. 1131, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 5843, 5844.
Finally, in 1982 Congress amended the CEA by expressly authorizing private rights of
action on behalf of market participants against members of an exchange and other traders
for certain violative activities. See Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1982)). See generally Sackheim, Parameters of Express Pri-
vate Rights of Action for Violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J.
51, 53 (1984).
For excellent summaries of the legislative history of the CEA, and the purposes and
weaknesses of its predecessors, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353, 360-67 (1982); see also Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Suc-
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nism for regulating the complex and volatile world of commodities
futures trading.2 To regulate the industry strictly, section 4 of the
CEA3 mandates that all dealings in commodities futures must be
transacted through an official board of trade called a "contract
market."' 4  The Commodities Futures Trading Commission
cessors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6-17 (1977) (discussion of commodities regulation in United
States).
2 See HR. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974). Section 3 of the CEA acknowl-
edges the economic significance of commodities futures trading, warning that such transac-
tions are subject to factors that may cause unexpected fluctuations in the price of commodi-
ties, and thereby obstruct and burden interstate commerce. See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
A commodity futures contract is an agreement for the purchase and sale of a particular
commodity. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SEcuRrEs FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §
4.6 (421) (1979). The seller commits himself to deliver the commodity at a fixed date in the
future, while the buyer commits himself to accept the delivery and pay an agreed price. Id.
These contracts are bought and sold to bidders in markets called "exchanges." Id. The
terms of these contracts, except for price, are governed by the rules of the exchange. Id.; see
also Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1971) (trading in commodities
futures must be conducted only in designated contract markets, in accordance with market
rules), cert. denied sub nom., 406 U.S. 932 (1972). Most futures contracts are not technically
performed by traders; the contract holders redeem them by entering offsetting futures con-
tracts in the exchange. See Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Com-
modity for Future Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1176
(1978); see also Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1980) (few futures con-
tracts actually result in delivery), aff'd sub nom., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
A purchaser of futures contracts who is bound either to accept the commodity when
tendered or make an offsetting sale is known as a "long" trader, while a trader who has sold
futures contracts is known as a "short" trader. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156-57; see also S. REP.
No. 1131 3d Cong., 2d Sess. app IX, reprinted in 174 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 5891
5891-94 (glossary of key commodity terms).
Futures trading can be divided into two broad categories: hedging and speculating. See
P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.11 (1982). Hedgers are producers and consumers
of a particular commodity who, to protect themselves against adverse price fluctuations,
acquire futures contracts that offset their normal commercial obligations. Id. § 1.12, at 38-
39. For example, a merchandiser of a commodity who has an agreement to purchase that
commodity at a fixed price may protect himself against falling prices of that commodity by
acquiring futures contracts under which he is obligated to sell that commodity at a fixed
price. Id. That merchandiser is said to have "hedged" against a price decrease. See Toy,
Implied Causes of Action Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 14 COMM. L. REv. 41, 44
(1981). Speculators, on the other hand, do not have an interest in the actual commodity, but
trade in futures contracts for investment purposes. See P. JOHNSON, supra, § 1.14, at 46.
3 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
1 Id. Section 4 prohibits dealings in commodity futures, except "where such contract is
made by or through a member of a board of trade which has been designated by the [Com-
modity Futures Trading] Commission as a 'contract market."' Id. These contract markets,
also known as "futures exchanges," are nonprofit organizations that draft and enforce trade
regulations, set quality standards for the commodity, and establish mechanisms for buyers
and sellers. See Bianco, The Mechanics of Futures Trading: Speculation and Manipula-
tion, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 34 (1977). First established in the United States in the nine-
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(CFTC)5 is empowered to regulate commodities futures trading
and is responsible for designating qualified boards of trade as con-
tract markets.6 Subject to approval by the CFTC, contract markets
are empowered to develop and enforce bylaws and regulations7 and
may enact temporary rules to deal with emergency situations with-
out CFTC approval." A private party may maintain an action for
damages only if the activity of a contract market is alleged to con-
stitute a bad faith violation of the CEA.9 Recently, in Sam Wong
teenth century, futures exchanges helped develop American agriculture into a stable and
efficient commercial system by providing systems of communication to guide prices, market-
ing, and distribution of commodities. Id. at 27; S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5853. For a history of the development
of commercial exchanges, see C. LEGG, THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES 1-16 (1912). For
a discussion of the requirements for designation of an exchange as a contract market, see
infra note 6 and accompanying text.
6 See 7 U.S.C. § 4a(1) (1982). The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
was created as an independent agency of the United States government, see id., "to
strengthen the regulation of futures trading," Statement of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88
Stat. 1389 (1978). See generally Smith, Preventing the Manipulation of Commodity Fu-
tures Markets: To Deliver or Not to Deliver, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1569-70 (1981) (to
prevent manipulation of commodity prices, futures markets strictly regulated by CFTC).
6 See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). To be designated a "contract market," the board of trade
must comply with certain requirements: the prospective contract market must be located at
a terminal market where the commodity is sold in substantial volume, and where inspection
facilities are located, id. § 7(a); the governing board of the market must provide for the
keeping of detailed records of all transactions to be entered into by the members, id. § 7(b);
and the board must provide for the prevention of price manipulation or cornering of any
commodity by any dealers or operators on the governing board, id. § 7(d).
Id. §§ 7a(1), (8) (1982).
8 Id. § 7a(12). The rules of the CFTC define an "emergency" as, inter alia,
(ii) an occurrence or circumstance which, in the opinion of the governing
board of the contract market, requires immediate action and threatens ... fair
and orderly trading in ... any contract for the future delivery of a commodity or
any commodity option on such contract market. Occurrences and circumstances
which may [constitute] emergencies include... :
(c) Any circumstances which may materially affect the performance of con-
tracts or commodity options traded on the contract market.
17'C.F.R. § 1.41(a)(4)(ii)(1984). CFTC rules require contract markets to maintain surveil-
lance of market activity for indications of situations that may cause price distortion. Id. §
1.51(a)(1).
9 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388 (1982).
Curran involved the consolidation of four lawsuits by investors that alleged violations of the
CEA by the various defendants. Id. at 356. In one case, the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant broker had violated the CEA by making "material misrepresentations" regarding com-
modity transactions made on the plaintiff's behalf. Id. at 368. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit made a sua sponte determination that a plaintiff could maintain a private
action for damages under the CEA. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.,
622 F.2d 216, 230 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
The other actions, which were in the Second Circuit consisted of three lawsuits by spec-
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& Son, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange,10 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff who alleged that
members of a contract market had acted in bad faith in taking
emergency action stated a cause of action," while another plaintiff,
who merely alleged a failure on the part of the New York Mercan-
tile Exchange to take timely emergency action concerning potato
crop failures, did not present a sufficient complaint. 2
In Sam Wong, a New York Mercantile Exchange (NYME or
Exchange) Maine Round White Potato Futures Contract provided
for the delivery of potatoes from Maine to Hunts Point, New
York13 during the standard delivery months of November, March,
April, and May.' 4 Of the fifty deliveries made in November 1978,
fifteen failed to pass inspection at Hunts Point.15 After a prelimi-
nary investigation 6 and continued monitoring of the situation
ulators in futures contracts against the New York Mercantile Exchange, in which the plain-
tiffs alleged a failure on the part of the Exchange to prevent manipulation of the contract
market by various traders. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 289 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). The plaintiffs
maintained that the Exchange could have prevented this manipulation if it had followed its
rules and declared an emergency once the situation became apparent. Id. at 291. The Sec-
ond Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, held that Congress was aware of previous
judicial recognition of private lawsuits under the CEA, and impliedly preserved them in its
1974 Amendments to the CEA. Id. at 307.
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, affirmed the Second and Sixth Circuits,
and held that the judicially created cause of action under the CEA had not been abolished
by the 1974 amendments to the CEA. 456 U.S. at 388. For a discussion of the development
of the private cause of action under the CEA, see infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
10 735 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1984).
11 Id. at 678.
12 Id. at 666, 670-71.
13 Id. at 657. Each Maine Round White Potato Futures Contract consisted of 50,000
pounds of potatoes delivered in a single truckload shipment. Id.
14 Id.
" Id. at 658. The NYME potato contract mandated two inspections for each delivery,
the first by a federally authorized state inspector in Maine, and the second by a federal
inspector at the final destination, Hunts Point. Id. at 657. Each truckload of potatoes deliv-
ered had to receive the U.S. No. 1 grade, as established by the United States Secretary of
Agriculture. Id.
All fifty deliveries passed inspection upon departure from Maine. Id. at 658. At Hunts
Point, eleven of the fifteen loads failed because of apparent deterioration in transport from
Maine. Id. These potatoes were highly pitted and discolored, which precluded their designa-
tion as U.S. No. 1 grade. Id. The other four truckloads, it was determined, should have been
rejected in Maine for similar qualitative failures. Id.
16 Id. In late November, the Exchange Potato Control Subcommittee reviewed the re-
sults of the November deliveries, and tentatively concluded that there were no foreseeable
problems. Id. Notwithstanding that determination, the president of the Exchange corre-
sponded with an official of the United States Department of Agriculture, seeking his opinion
on the problem with the Maine potatoes. Id. This official informed the NYME president
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through January and February of 1979, the NYME concluded that
the substandard November deliveries were not indications of seri-
ous danger, and that there was a sufficient supply of potatoes for
the spring deliveries.17 In the first week of March, however,
twenty-nine of thirty-two loads of potatoes failed inspection at
Hunts Point, prompting an emergency suspension of potatoes fu-
tures trading by the NYME. s Sam Wong & Son, Inc. (Wong), a
potato grower who held short positions19 in the 1979 contracts,
sued the NYME, alleging that the NYME should have acted more
decisively when the problem first appeared, and should have
amended the terms of the potato contract to create a better hedg-
ing device.20 However, Anthony Spinale, a speculator in potato fu-
tures, noted that voting board members of the NYME were inter-
ested in the outcome of the situation, and asserted that their
drastic emergency action prevented him from gaining additional
that a high percentage of the Maine potato crop of the year was marginally defective but
assured the president that the Department of Agriculture would, if necessary, act to prevent
a recurrence of the problem. Id.
17 Id. The Exchange, at its regular February meeting, focused its attention on the dis-
crepancies between the Maine and New York inspections, and gave little attention to the
quality of the year's potato crop. Id. In fact, the Exchange's field representative in Maine
and its monitoring staff in New York both reported "that there was a sufficient deliverable
supply of potatoes." Id. However, the CFTC Chief of Market Surveillance maintained that
the November 1978 deliveries foreshadowed later problems with the spring deliveries. Id. at
658 n.7. He reported that by November rumors were beginning to spread in the potato in-
dustry that the crop might be defective because of a dry season. Id. at 658 n.7.
18 Id. at 658-61 (quoting from the Report of the Division of Trading and Markets, Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (Feb. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Report]). The
March deliveries failed inspection because the potatoes were "sunken and discolored," the
same problem that plagued the November deliveries. Id. at 658 (quoting the Report, supra).
In the week after the delivery failures, prices for the April and May contracts rose precip-
itously in trading on the Exchange. Id. at 658-659 (quoting the Report, supra). The NYME,
after speaking to traders, officials of the Maine potato industry, and Department of Agricul-
ture officials, finally concluded that the true problem was with the quality of the crop, not
with inspection inconsistencies, as had been previously considered. Id. at 659. In an all-night
emergency meeting on March 8-9, 1979, The Board of the Exchange declared that an emer-
gency situation existed, and to protect the market from further deterioration, the Board
suspended trading in the April and May contracts. Id. at 660-61. Furthermore, the Board
provided for the liquidation of any unfulfilled March contracts, at a price to be determined
by the Exchange. Id. at 661.
19 See supra note 2.
20 735 F.2d at 656-57. Wong's action was similar to a lawsuit against the NYME in
1976, in which price manipulation by certain traders had led to widescale potato price fluc-
tuations. Id. at 657 n.3; see Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). In Leist, the
injured traders alleged that Exchange officials "knew or should have known" of the emer-
gency situation, but failed to take proper action. 638 F.2d at 292.
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profits.21 The district court dismissed Wong's claim because it did
not adequately allege that the Exchange had acted in bad faith.22
In addition, the court granted summary judgment for the NYME
against Spinale, stating that he failed to raise genuine issues of fact
concerning bad faith on the part of the Exchange. 3
A unanimous Second Circuit panel affirmed the decision of the
district court with regard to Wong,24 but reversed the summary
judgment granted against Spinale2 Writing for the court, Judge
Friendly determined that bad faith must be the standard of liabil-
ity in a lawsuit against an exchange based on action taken by that
exchange. 26 Accordingly, the court maintained that the standard of
liability for the failure of an exchange to take discretionary action
21 735 F.2d at 657, 672-73. Spinale claimed that the emergency actions were motivated
partly by the personal animosity of certain Board members towards him, and partly because
certain Board members had financial interests in potato futures contracts. Id. at 672-73.
Additionally, Spinale alleged that the actions were so negligent as to constitute bad faith.
Id. at 672.
22 Jordon v. New York Mercantile Exch., 571 F. Supp. 1530, 1541-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom., Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Ex-
change, 735 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1984). In Jordon, Judge Sofaer ruled, inter alia, that a com-
plaint alleging inadequate regulation by an exchange must also allege bad faith on the part
of the exchange as a basis for its action or inaction. Id. at 1542.
23 Id. at 1544. The district court rejected Spinale's claim that the board acted with self-
interest and bad faith, and held that exchange self-regulation mandated that some members
of an exchange would have a degree of self-interest in exchange actions. Id. at 1544-45. The
court stated that to allow a lawsuit based on vague allegations of bad faith would undermine
the exchange self regulation concept. Id. at 1545. In addition, the court noted that Spinale,
as a long trader, had been in a position to reap substantial benefits because of the delivery
failures and subsequent price inflation, but had refused to compromise his position or allow
his contracts to be liquidated, insisting on delivery. Id. at 1551. The court held further that
any personal animosity between the board members and Spinale arose in connection with
Spinale's dealings. Id. As a result, the animosity was within the context of the board's self-
regulatory duties, and could not support a determination of bad faith on the part of the
Exchange. Id. The court also implied that the board was justified in its animosity toward
Spinale, since one of its duties was to prevent traders from acting with excessive greed in a
time of crisis. Id. at 1552.
24 See 735 F.2d at 666-71. Refusing to recognize a private cause of action alleging a
failure by an exchange to amend its contracts, the Wong court held that Congress did not
intend to create such a right, and that such a provision would be completely unworkable. Id.
at 669-70. The complaint alleging failure by the exchange to act promptly also failed. See id.
at 670-71. The court, while not completely ruling out a cause of action for the failure of an
exchange to take emergency action, did not decide the question, since Wong's complaint
failed to allege bad faith, as required for suits against an exchange. Id. at 670; see supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
21 735 F.2d at 678.
26 Id. at 670. (citing Daniel v. Board of Trade, 164 F.2d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 1947)). In
Daniel, the bad faith standard for suits against an exchange was established with respect to
actions taken by the exchange. 735 F.2d at 670.
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could not reasonably be less than bad faith.27 Recognizing that the
Exchange promptly investigated the delivery problems, the court
reasoned that the failure of the Exchange to realize the magnitude
of the problem did not constitute bad faith, and thus Wong's com-
plaint lacked an essential element.28 The court of appeals dis-
agreed with the district court regarding Spinale's complaint, how-
ever, deciding that it was a question of fact whether the personal
animosity of -members of the Exchange toward Spinale, or their
possible financial interests in the Exchange's decision, motivated
the emergency actions of the Exchange.29 Judge Friendly deter-
mined that Spinale would have the initial burden of showing that
personal animosity or financial interests were "a substantial or mo-
tivating factor" behind the action or inaction of the Exchange.3
The court stated that, should Spinale meet this burden, the Ex-
2 735 F.2d at 670. The court took notice of 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(4)(d) (1982), which, al-
though only applicable to cases accruing subsequent to January 11, 1983, makes bad faith
the standard of liability, whether or not any action was taken by an exchange. See 735 F.2d
at 670.
28 735 F.2d at 671. The Wong court also affirmed the dismissal of that part of the com-
plaint that alleged a conspiracy of unnamed corporations and individuals to increase and
manipulate prices in the potato futures market, finding that there were no allegations of
actual or constructive knowledge by the defendants of any conspiracy. Id. The court also
noted that, although the Exchange might be criticized for not launching a more thorough
investigation when the delivery problem first arose, such an oversight was not actionable
absent an allegation of bad faith. Id.
29 Id. at 678. The court noted that the motives of the Board members in taking emer-
gency actions were at issue, and could not easily be determined on a motion for summary
judgment. Id. Disagreeing with the determination of the district court, Judge Friendly noted
that although Spinale's business conduct may have been distasteful to the board members,
Spinale was simply capitalizing on his business acumen, and evidence of animosity by the
board members toward Spinale arising from business dealings could support a finding of
bad faith. See id. The court concluded that Spinale was entitled to limited discovery to
ascertain the financial interests of the defendants in the matter, the discussions and occur-
rences at the board's emergency meeting, and the rationality of the board's emergency ac-
tions. Id. & n.32. The court recognized that, although contract market officials have broad
discretion in regulating their exchanges, the concept of exchange self-regulation requires the
court to provide a test that does not give such officials immunity "from answering serious
questions posed by injured traders." Id. at 677. If exchange officials were never required to
answer for their actions, Judge Friendly warned, the private right of action under the CEA
would be virtually eradicated. Id.
20 See id. at 677. The test applied by Judge Friendly was adopted from a similar stan-
dard applied by the Supreme Court in cases involving discriminatory discharges of pro-
union employees. Compare Sam Wong, 735 F.2d at 667 with NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) (employee had burden of persuading NLRB that
employee would have been fired regardless of union activities) and Mount Healthy City Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (once discharged employee met his burden, bur-
den shifted to employer to show that employer not motivated to punish employee).
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change could still avoid liability by proving that its action or inac-
tion was in the public interest and would have occurred regardless
of any personal animosity or financial concerns of members of the
Exchange.3 1
The Sam Wong decisions represent an attempt by the Second
Circuit to establish parameters for the private cause of action cre-
ated by the Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran,32 and presently set forth in the Commodity
Exchange Act.3 It is submitted, however, that the Second Circuit
unduly restricted the availability of the private cause of action for
injured commodities traders by its strict adherence to the bad
faith requirement. In light of the importance of the private cause
of action in the scheme of commodities market self-regulation
under the CEA, it is suggested that redress should be made availa-
ble to those who are victims of reckless activity by contract mar-
kets, as well as to those who may fall prey to the improper motives
of exchange board members. This Comment will explore the pri-
vate cause of action and will attempt to demonstrate that a reck-
lessness standard is needed to provide a remedy for injured com-
modities traders who are not currently protected by the industry's
system of self-regulation.
THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION AND EXCHANGE SELF-REGULATION
To combat the threat of destructive price fluctuations which
may be caused by price manipulation and other price abuses by
commodities traders, the United States relies heavily on exchange
31 735 F.2d at 677.
32 456 U.S. 353 (1982); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
3' See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1982). In 1982 Congress expressly amended the CEA to include
the private right of action that had been created by judicial decisions throughout the coun-
try, culminating with the decision in Curran. See Sackheim, supra note 1, at 71. Prior to
1982, the federal courts had disagreed as to the existence of an implied private right of
action under the CEA. Compare Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978)
(private action under CEA would lie, but plaintiff failed to prove causation) and Jones v.
B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 221 (D. Kan. 1979) ("private right of action may
be implied under . . . Act") with Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 311, 321 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (no section of Act grants jurisdiction with respect to private
parties) and Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (no private
right of action can be implied under CEA).
The private cause of action provision was added by the Futures Trading Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294, 2322-24 (1983). Although 7 U.S.C. § 25 technically did not
govern the Sam Wong case, the Court made reference to its provisions. See 735 F.2d at 665-
66.
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self-regulation. 34 Charged with the responsibility of protecting the
integrity of commodities trading, contract markets are required to
promulgate and enforce their own rules35 and must maintain con-
stant surveillance of market activity to detect situations that might
lead to price distortions.36 If an exchange fails to regulate its mem-
bers, it faces suspension or revocation of its designation as a con-
tract market37 and may be subject to liability in private actions
brought by injured traders.3 s
The private cause of action under the CEA is a relatively re-
cent development.39 For the first thirty years following the enact-
ment of the CEA in 1936, traders were required to settle their
grievances through arbitration and mediation mechanisms pro-
vided by the exchanges.40 In the early 1960's, however, many trad-
ers became dissatisfied with private settlements of their complaints
and sought relief in federal court for violations of the CEA.41
In 1967, the private cause of action for a violation of the CEA
was recognized for the first time in Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co.
42
In Goodman, a group of plaintiffs brought a class action against
the defendant broker, alleging violations of the Commodity Ex-
34 See S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5843, 5855-56; Note, Abuses in the Commodity Markets: The Need for Change in the
Regulatory Structure, 63 GEO. L.J. 751, 761 (1975). The Commodity Exchange Act is
targeted at abuses such as price manipulation, excessive speculation, and various fraudulent
and fictitious transactions that tend to impair commodities trading. See S. REP. No. 1131,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5856. In addi-
tion to preventing these abuses, the exchanges must establish trading limits to prevent
"sudden or unreasonable" price fluctuations. See 7 U.S.C. § 69 (1982); Note, supra, at 761.
" See 7 U.S.C. § 7a (1)(8)(9) (1982). Contract market rules must be previously ap-
proved by the CFTC. Id.
3 See 17 C.F.R. § 1.51 (a)(1) (1984). Among other things, Contract markets must moni-
tor price movements, volume of trading in the market, market news and gossip. See Con-
tract Market Rule Enforcement Program, Guideline No. 2, 1 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
6430 (1982).
37 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7, 8 (1982).
38 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
11 See Note, Private Rights of Action Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion Act of 1974: The Curran Decision, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 561, 565-66; see also Goodman v. H.
Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (existence of civil remedy under CEA
had never previously been determined). Courts previously had entertained lawsuits against
exchanges for allegations of fraud and antitrust violations, but these lawsuits were not im-
plied from provisions of the CEA. See, e.g., Daniel v. Board of Trade, 164 F.2d 815, 820 (7th
Cir. 1947) (fraud); Cargill v. Board of Trade, 164 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1947) (antitrust),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 880 (1948).
40 See Note, supra note 39, at 565 & n.31.
41 See id. at 565-66.
42 265 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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change Act, and the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a
valid cause of action.43 While stating that no civil remedy had been
expressly created by the CEA, the court held that the statute cre-
ated a private cause of action by meeting a two part test: the stat-
ute was intended to protect the interests of individuals such as the
plaintiffs; and the interest invaded by the defendants was one that
the enactment was intended to protect.44
The Goodman rationale was adopted by a number of courts in
cases involving broker fraud45 and in cases involving allegations
that an exchange failed to enforce its rules. 46 By 1974, most federal
courts routinely and consistently recognized an implied private
cause of action under the CEA.47 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran,45 the Supreme Court eliminated any
doubt regarding the existence of an implied private cause of ac-
tion.49 The Court gave its imprimatur to the private action, saying
43 Id. at 442, 446-47. The plaintiffs in Goodman, customers of the defendant broker,
alleged that the defendant's agent had defrauded them and had made several false state-
ments in a number of commodities transactions, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1982). See
265 F. Supp. at 442, 447.
"1 See 265 F. Supp. at 447. The Goodman court noted that private causes of action had
been recognized for certain violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1982). See 265 F. Supp. at 447.
4' See, e.g., Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970)
(allegedly excessive trading of account by broker); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61,
65 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (allegations of false representations by broker); Johnson v. Arthur Es-
pey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (allegation of "churn-
ing" by broker, i.e., excessive trading to generate commissions).
46 See, e.g., Case & Co. v. Board of Trade, 523 F.2d 355, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1975) (failure
to give required notice of suspension of trading limits); Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479
F.2d 529, 530, 534 (7th Cir.) (failure of exchange to present unlawful manipulation by cer-
tain traders on exchange), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Chicago Mercantile Exch. v.
Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1084
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (failure by exchange to maintain orderly market), aff'd sub nom., Miller v.
New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1977).
47 See, e.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 779 (5th Cir. 1980) (all courts
unanimously allowed private cause of action under CEA before 1974), vacated for further
consideration, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); see also Davis, The Commodity Exchange Act: Statu-
tory Scheme is Not Authorization of an Implied Private Cause of Action, 46 Mo. L. REv.
316, 321 (1981) (prior to 1974 federal courts routinely assumed private causes of action
under CEA).
48 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
1 Id. at 381. In 1974, amendments to the CEA created some doubt whether private
causes of action were authorized. See Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, 1389-95 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C. (1982)). Inter alia, the amendments were designed to prevent contract markets
from attempting to limit their exposure to liability by eliminating certain rules. See Note,
supra note 39, at 567. The rationale behind these actions seemed to be that the less rules an
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that it had "enhance[d] the enforcement mechanism fostered by
Congress over the course of 60 years."50
It is submitted that, in light of the significant role the private
cause of action plays in the system of regulation under the CEA,
its availability should not be limited to those plaintiffs who can
demonstrate improper motives on the part of a defendant. The re-
strictive interpretation of "bad faith" applied in Sam Wong, 1 it is
submitted, drastically curtailed the utility of the private cause of
action as a means of protecting commodities traders. It is sug-
gested that, if the private cause of action is also made available to
those plaintiffs who can demonstrate that a contract market acted
in a reckless manner, the regulation of futures trading would be
strengthened, and the legislative purpose of the CEA would be
exchange had the lower the chance of a lawsuit based upon the non-enforcement of those
rules. See id. at 567 n.40. The 1974 amendments to the CEA did not expressly mention
private lawsuits, leaving some courts to maintain that Congress has implicitly eliminated
them. See, e.g., Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 781 (5th Cir. 1980) (implied judicial
private right of action was not included in 1974 revision of CEA), vacated for further con-
sideration, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F.
Supp. 202, 209-10 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (private judicial right of action did not survive 1974
Amendments); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.
Utah 1981) ("1974 amendments to CEA extinguished any private right of action previously
available"). But see Leist v. Simplot, 638 F. 2d 283, 307 (2d Cir. 1980) (legislative history
amply demonstrates Congress' awareness of private right of action under CEA, and desire to
preserve it), aff'd sub nom., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353 (1982); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 115 (N.D. 111. 1979) (private right of action
is consistent with statutory purpose of CFTCA); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F.
Supp. 733, 737-38 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (legislative history precludes finding that Congress in-
tended to overrule judicially created private action under CEA).
In Merrill Lynch, the Court relied upon criteria established in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975), focusing on the intent of Congress in enacting the 1974 amendments, see 456 U.S. at
377-78. The Court concluded that the implied cause of action under the CEA was "part of
the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress legislated in 1974." Id. at 381 (quoting
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979)). The Court reasoned that, be-
cause Congress did not change the statutory provisions under which the cause of action had
been implied, it was apparent that "Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that rem-
edy." 456 U.S. at 381-82.
50 456 U.S. at 387.
"X See 735 F.2d at 670; supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. Wong maintained
that the exchange had violated 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982), which requires contract markets to
enforce all bylaws, rules, and regulations of the CFTC, by failing to monitor the market for
possibly disruptive situations, as mandated by CFTC Regulation 1.51(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. §
1.51(a)(2) (1984). See 735 F.2d at 670. The court in Wong required that a private cause of
action allege affirmative bad faith, as evidenced by the exchange's knowledge of some fraud-
ulent activities or by ulterior motives on the part of exchange members as a basis for their
failure to act. See id. at 670-71. It is submitted that the court did not consider a "reckless
bad faith" standard-liability predicated upon proof that the exchange acted recklessly in
failing to monitor closely the market situation and discover the potential delivery problems.
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furthered.52
"RECKLESS BAD FAITH" AS A STANDARD FOR EXCHANGE LIABILITY
"Bad faith" can be described as a state of mind operating with
furtive design or ill will.5 3 "Scienter," as a requirement for securi-
ties fraud lawsuits, has been defined as "intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud. '54 Numerous cases have held that reckless con-
duct 55 can constitute scienter or bad faith in lawsuits involving
fraudulent commodities56 and securities transactions.57
52 See supra note 1; see also H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974) (public
interest requires that contract markets operate under close scrutiny so that they best serve
legitimate market functions).
I" See Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga. App. 615, 617, 137 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1964); Stath v. Wil-
liams, 367 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Ind. App. 1977).
4 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
"I See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTs 213 (5th ed. 1984) (to act "reck-
lessly" is to act in disregard of obvious risk). Liability for recklessness is based on construc-
tive knowledge-i.e., the actor is presumed to have been aware of an obvious risk. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has defined recklessness as "highly unreasonable con-
duct which is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care." Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979). Reckless behavior is more
closely related to intentional conduct than to negligence. See Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
56 See, e.g., First Commodity Corp. v. CFTC, 676 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982) (CFTC can
base liability for broker fraud on recklessness); CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir.
1979) (knowledge, for purposes of fraudulent intent, exists when one acts in careless disre-
gard of whether his acts amount to fraud); Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir.
1977) (willfulness includes actions done in "careless disregard of statutory requirements")
(quoting Goodman v. Benson, 286 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1961)).
" See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979)
(majority of courts have concluded that recklessness satisfies scienter requirement for secur-
ities fraud); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978) (recklessness,
defined as "carelessness approaching indifference," can serve as ground for securities fraud
action); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir.) (recklessness can
constitute scienter in "appropriate circumstance"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Bro-
kerage firms have been held liable for securities fraud in cases in which it has been deter-
mined that they acted in reckless disregard for their client's interests. See, e.g., Hatrock v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 1984) (excessive trading on client's
account); Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984)
(failure to advise client of risks of transactions).
It has been noted that securities and commodities trading have many similarities, and
that section 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), has significantly
influenced commodities law. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LowENFFLs, supra note 2, at § 1.1; see
also CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 660-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(there are similarities and analogies between securities and commodities antifraud provi-
sions); Johnson, Applying Hochfelder in Commodity Fraud Cases, 20 B.C.L. REv. 633, 633
(1979) (§ 4b of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982), analogized to § 10b of Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)). It is submitted that the "reckless bad faith" standard, as
adopted from both securities and commodities fraud cases, is an appropriate standard for
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A number of cases involving contract market liability for fail-
ure to act in emergency situations have made reference to a form
of the reckless bad faith standard. 8 Judge Friendly himself has
acknowledged a reckless standard in both securities59 and com-
modities fraud cases.60 In dictum, the district court in Wong as-
serted that "[o]nly a demonstration of reckless and virtually irra-
tional exchange behavior could . . . independently [constitute]
. ..bad faith."61 Judge Friendly, however, declined to adopt such
an approach, deciding instead that, for an exchange to be held lia-
ble for failure to act, it must know of an impending problem and
refuse to act on it.82
The reckless bad faith standard, it is suggested, will prove use-
ful in cases in which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove the defendant's knowledge of impending emergency situa-
tions63 and would significantly increase the chances of punishing
those persons whose conduct is tantamount to fraud. 4
imposing liability on an exchange for its failure to take necessary action in emergency
situations.
"8 See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1980) (exchange officials "knew
or should have known" of emergency situation), aff'd sub nom., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 118
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (private action is available against exchanges that knew or should have
known of fraudulent conduct by their members). One of the claims upheld in Curran was
that the NYME "knew or should have known" of alleged conspiracies to manipulate the
contract market, but failed to prevent them. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 371; see also Gordon v.
Hunt, 558 F. Supp. 122, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dictum) (Curran may authorize lawsuits
against exchange on less restrictive bases than traditional bad faith).
59 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (liability can be imposed for "the type of recklessness that is equivalent to will-
ful fraud"), cert. denied sub nom. 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
'0 See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J.), aff'd sub nom.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); supra note 58.
6' See Jordan v. New York Mercantile Exch., 571 F. Supp. 1530, 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(dictum), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New York Mercan-
tile Exch., 735 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1984).
62 See Sam Wong, 735 F.2d at 671. Judge Friendly determined that Wong's allegations
concerning the failure of the exchange to act did not meet the bad faith standard: that is,
knowledge of an impending crisis, or some ulterior motive in failing to act. Id. But cf. CFTC
v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979) (knowledge cannot be precluded by ignorance
brought about by carelessly ignoring truth). While it is not maintained that the New York
Mercantile Exchange ignored the truth, it is submitted that Judge Friendly's requirement of
knowledge is too stringent for the purposes of exchange liability.
63 Cf. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abet-
ting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delecto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
597, 635-36 (1972) (often court will not have direct evidence regarding knowledge, based on
circumstances). Knowledge, in effect, can be shown by reckless conduct. Id. at 638.
" See Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5,
COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT
CONCLUSION
By failing to adopt a reckless bad faith standard for exchange
liability, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has strictly
limited actions against an exchange. Under the test applied by
Judge Friendly to the action brought by Spinale, only a plaintiff
who alleges a conflict of interest or ulterior motive on the part of
an exchange will be given an opportunity to develop his theory.
The strict bad faith requirement set down in Sam Wong will insu-
late exchanges from liability for decisions that may have been
reckless, and may even encourage plaintiffs to make allegations of
bad faith that have no basis in fact to avoid dismissal. Whether
price fluctuations and instability are caused by fraudulent or reck-
less decisions by an exchange is immaterial; the harmful effect on
futures trading is the same, and lawsuits involving either of these
allegations deserve equal treatment.
Joseph M. Barry
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213, 240 (1977).
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